Large grey potash storage domes and a conveyor at a mine site, with rail cars in the foreground under a bright yellow sunset sky

How Donald Trump’s Belarus Potash Deal Gives Russia Another Ace to Play

The National Interest

Shipping Belarus’ potash to the United States would undermine US-Canada trade and give Russia a chokehold on US agriculture.

President Donald Trump announced on Truth Social on September 21 that his administration was negotiating a “massive” deal to buy potash from Belarus, claiming farmers would pay substantially less than they do for the Canadian supply. Potash, a potassium-rich mineral, is one of the three core nutrients (alongside nitrogen and phosphorus) that fertilize American crops, and most US farmers get it from Canada.

The next day, the president walked it back, partly. In follow-up remarks, he said the United States will keep buying Canadian potash but will still pursue the Belarus deal: “Belarus has a lot of potash, and our farmers need good prices, and we want to get a lower price.” So Canada stays in the picture for now, and Minsk becomes a bargaining chip. Saskatchewan Premier Scott Moe shot back, calling it “blood potash” and noting that Belarusian potash must cross Russia, an ocean, and half the continental United States to reach a Midwest farm. Obviously, the premier of Canada’s potash-producing province would be cross with the deal, but American farmers should be wary, too.

Start with the president’s cost claim, because it doesn’t hold up. Belarus is landlocked, and EU sanctions have closed its most direct export route: the Lithuanian port of Klaipeda. With that door shut, every tonne bound for the US must travel overland through Russia, load at a Russian port, and cross the Atlantic before touching American soil.

Canadian potash, by contrast, moves from Saskatchewan over an established rail and port network with direct lines into the American Midwest. It’s a supply chain decades in the making, with no war zone anywhere on the route. Fertilizer analyst Josh Linville put it plainly: even if a route through EU states to the Baltic were possible, “the relatively low current value of potash makes it hard to justify exports through the Baltic and across the Atlantic.” The White House’s math doesn’t add up on paper, let alone in practice.

But set aside the cost question, and this is where the prospect of Belarusian potash becomes a geopolitical nightmare. The EU sanctions blocking a route through the European Union aren’t going anywhere, and repealing them would require unanimous consent from all 27 EU member states. This just is not going to happen without political change in Belarus. Belarusian potash exports are thus permanently dependent on Russian rail and ports to reach any market. That means American farmers’ access to a critical input for the planting season would run through infrastructure that Russian President Vladimir Putin controls. He could end that export supply chain with a phone call.

By going this route, the Trump administration would hand President Putin an ace he could play at any time as leverage over the US economy and the food supply. This could, if the deal is as “massive” as the president says it is, mirror European dependence on Russian natural gas. Handing Putin that second lever of pressure on the West, now over the fertilizer that feeds American crops, represents a self-inflicted vulnerability with a foreign policy price tag that nobody has yet priced in.

Supporters of the deal will say that Trump is just playing hardball to bring down costs for farmers after years of high input prices. That instinct—wanting cheaper fertilizer—is entirely reasonable. But the evidence suggests that sourcing it through a landlocked, sanctioned country won’t deliver. America would be reliant on Putin’s goodwill.

The Trump administration already ran this experiment once, and the results should have settled the question. When Washington imposed 50 percent tariffs on Canadian aluminum, Canadian producers didn’t sit on their hands. Aluminerie Alouette, North America’s largest smelter, boosted its European sales from 4 percent to 57 percent in mere months. In response, the United States leaned harder on suppliers in the Persian Gulf, with the UAE and Bahrain together supplying a quarter of unwrought aluminum imports. Then the Iran War and disrupted shipping through the Strait of Hormuz forced American manufacturers to realize that their new supply sat on the wrong side of a contested waterway. Punishing a reliable neighbor to chase savings from a geopolitically exposed alternative proved a mistake, one the administration shouldn’t repeat, especially because Canadian producers can look elsewhere.

Canada, while economically reliant on the United States, is not necessarily a captive supplier that the trade fight assumes. Roughly half of Canada’s potash exports go to buyers outside the US, which proves Canadian producers do, in fact, have options elsewhere when it makes sense. Pushing American farmers away from that supply doesn’t risk a worse deal between Canada and the United States—it risks no deal at all—if Ottawa decides diversification should run further than it already has.

Of course, there is a better path forward: fix the trading relationship with Canada, a neighbor unburdened by war, and a reliable supplier with advanced infrastructure. Don’t chase imaginary savings that depend on Vladimir Putin’s good graces to keep the supply chain functional.

American farmers need affordable fertilizer, but cheap inputs aren’t cheap if one cost is betting that Moscow won’t cut off supply halfway through planting season.

Published on The National Interest.

Economic policyForeign policyTrade and tariffs